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A Hierarchical Coloured Petri Net Model of Fleet Maintenance
with Cannibalisation
Abstract
Cannibalisation refers to a maintenance action where an unserviceable part in an inoperative platform is replaced
by a serviceable part of the same type from another platform. It helps a fleet meet operational requirements when
spares are in short supply but leads to more maintenance tasks to be carried out. In practice, cannibalisation may be
performed in an unrestricted manner, or through the use of cannibalisation birds. A cannibalisation bird is a platform
which is selected as the primary source of cannibalisation, while any inoperative platform can be a cannibalisation
source under the unrestricted policy. In order to aid fleet managers in making cannibalisation-related decisions, this
paper presents a hierarchical coloured Petri net (HCPN) model of a fleet operation and maintenance process which
considers mission-oriented operation, multiple level maintenance, multiple cannibalisation policies (no
cannibalisation, unrestricted cannibalisation and cannibalisation bird), maintenance scheduling and spare inventory
management. The model is applied to an example fleet to compare the effects of different cannibalisation policies
on fleet performance using a number of performance measures related to reliability and maintenance and to optimise
the number of cannibalisation birds used and the length of time that a platform is taken as a cannibalisation bird for
the fleet.
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1. Introduction
Cannibalisation is a maintenance activity that involves removing serviceable parts from one platform to replace
failed parts in other platforms when the required spares are unavailable. It can restore non-mission-capable (NMC)
platforms to the mission-capable (MC) state in a short time when the fleet spare inventory cannot meet the demand
for spares. Cannibalisation is widely used in military aviation, with approximately 850000 documented
cannibalisations performed in the U.S. Air Force and Navy from 1996 to 2001 [1]. Fleet cannibalisation can be
either unrestricted or follow a cannibalisation bird policy. Under unrestricted cannibalisation, all NMC platforms
in the fleet can be cannibalised from and any of their working components used in the place of spares when spares
are unavailable. By contrast, when the cannibalisation bird policy is implemented, only designated platforms can
be used as sources of cannibalised spare parts. When components of other aircraft fail and there are no spares in
stock, maintenance crews remove the required components from the cannibalisation bird and install them in the
destination platform to make it mission capable. Thus, any part shortages are consolidated into the cannibalisation
bird. If a cannibalised platform remains in the NMC state for too long, it is referred to as a hangar queen [2]. When
an aircraft becomes a hangar queen in the U.S. Air Force, it is required to be reported up the chain of command and
poorly affects the wing’s rating [2].
Current research on cannibalisation mainly focuses on evaluating the impact of unrestricted cannibalisation on fleet
performance. Fisher [3] provides an overall review of the issues present in cannibalisation decisions and the related
models. Cassady et al. [4] develop a discrete-event simulation model to quantify the effect of unrestricted
cannibalisation on fleet readiness (the average number of MC platforms) and manpower working hours. Each
platform in the fleet is assumed to consist of two components connected in series. Ormon and Cassady [5] extend
the work of Cassady et al. [4] by taking the discrete-event simulation model as a decision-support tool to optimise
cannibalisation policies and spare part inventories. The platforms studied are the same as those studied by Cassady
et al. [4]. Fleet readiness and maintenance cost are used to measure fleet performance and two optimisation models
are built. The first aims to maximise fleet readiness subject to maintenance budget constraints and the second
minimises maintenance cost subject to fleet readiness limitations. Salman et al. [1] extend the work of Ormon and
Cassady [5] by studying more complex fleets in which component failure times follow Weibull distributions. Sheng
and Prescott [6] build a coloured Petri net (CPN) model for the unrestricted fleet cannibalisation process considering
multiple fleet maintenance factors including spares, repair, platform failure logic and queuing of platforms prior to
their restoration. However, none of these cannibalisation models involves the cannibalisation bird policy.
The cannibalisation bird policy is widely used in U.S. military aircraft fleets [4]. Generally, there is only one
cannibalisation bird in an aircraft fleet and the cannibalisation bird will not be used to perform missions even when
in the fully operative state. After having been kept as a bird for a pre-determined period of time (usually less than
30 days), an aircraft will be restored to a MC, flyable status in a process named cannibalisation recovery and another
aircraft will be selected as the new cannibalisation bird. In the literature, there are very few studies of cannibalisation
bird programmes. Based on cannibalisation practices at the U.S. Hill Air Force Base, Cassady et al. [4] establish an
aircraft-level simulation model to study a cannibalisation bird program. When spare requests cannot be satisfied, a
cannibalisation bird is checked for the required components. Without determining whether or not those components
are available, they use a mathematical function to model the usefulness of the cannibalisation bird, a feature that
decreases while it remains on the ground. Powell [14] introduces the cannibalisation bird practice in an F-16 aircraft
fleet deployed at the U.S. Hill Air Force Base and summarises the effect of the cannibalisation bird policy on fleet
performance according to the real data collected. However, no mathematical models of the implementation of
cannibalisation bird policies are provided [14].
The fleet maintenance process is a complex system which involves various activities, maintenance policies,
maintenance organisations and the management of maintenance resources, many of which could affect the
desirability of cannibalisation. Fleet maintenance is often organised into three levels: organisation- (O-),
intermediate- (I-) and depot-level (D-), or sometimes only O-level and D-level. NMC platforms are maintained at
the O-level maintenance organisation where their failed components are replaced by spares or through
cannibalisation. Removed, failed components are sent to the I-level maintenance organisation for repair or to the
depot in case of two-level maintenance. Failed components that cannot be repaired at the I-level will be sent to the
depot. After repair at I-level or D-level, previously-failed components are returned to the fleet as new spares. The
use of cannibalisation is affected by the capability to repair failed components at the I-level. Since the depot can be
a considerable distance from the fleet’s operational base, cannibalisation may be more desirable if there is no I-level
maintenance organisation or the I-level maintenance organisation is incapable of repairing many failed components.
A fleet cannibalisation model should aim to involve those maintenance factors.
Fleet operation and maintenance are tightly related. The fleet maintenance tasks come about because of the fleet
operations and the efficiency of fleet maintenance organisations can significantly affect the operational performance
of the fleet. Cannibalisation may be necessary due to weaknesses in fleet logistic and maintenance systems and fleet
managers may choose to perform cannibalisation to avoid the risk of missing mission sorties due to stock shortages.
However, operational factors such as mission scheduling or fleet assignment are rarely considered during
cannibalisation. The effectiveness of cannibalisation is also affected by decision variables such as the selection
discipline of cannibalisation sources, the number of birds and the length of time that a platform remains a bird.
Designating more aircraft to be cannibalisation birds or using shorter bird lives means there will be more
cannibalisation resources but fewer MC (mission capable) platforms and a higher burden of cannibalisation recovery.
Fewer birds or longer bird lives lead to less cannibalisation recovery effort but fewer available cannibalisation
resources and a higher risk of failures of previously functioning components in cannibalisation birds. Therefore, the
fleet maintenance model should also involve fleet mission-oriented operations and be capable of investigating
cannibalisation decision variables.
Very few indicators of overall fleet performance are used to measure the influence of cannibalisation, with the most
commonly-used being fleet readiness (average number of MC platforms), maintenance cost and consumed
manpower hours. Reliability and operational parameters that might better indicate fleet performance are rarely
studied. Therefore, benefits may result from modelling both fleet operation and maintenance and using reliability-
and operation-related measures to ascertain the impact of cannibalisation on fleet performance.
The first objective of this paper is to model fleet mission-oriented operation and multi-level maintenance processes
under three different cannibalisation policies: no cannibalisation, unrestricted cannibalisation and the
cannibalisation bird policy. A novel hierarchical CPN (HCPN) model is presented, which allows the analysis of any
of these policies for fleets with different size (number of platforms), operational requirements, maintenance
organisations and maintenance policies without modification of the HCPN model. The second objective of this
paper is to demonstrate how the HCPN model can be applied to example fleets, and used to evaluate and compare
the effects of different cannibalisation policies on fleet performance and to investigate the effect on cannibalisation
of factors such as the number of cannibalisation birds used at one time and the length a platform is kept as a bird.
The model allows the study of reliability- and operation-related measures relating to fleet performance, namely the
mission abort rate (MAR), mission capable rate (MCR) and cannibalisation rate (CAR), in addition to the
maintenance cost. The application of the model demonstrates its potential application as a maintenance decision
support tool for fleets.
2. Petri Nets
Petri nets (PN), first introduced by Carl Adam Petri in 1962 [8], are powerful graphical and mathematical tools for
modelling complex, dynamic systems. Since they can be constructed at various levels of abstraction and designed
hierarchically, PN have been successfully applied in many fields, including reliability assessment [9,11,17],
maintenance modelling [6,10,12] and railway bridge asset management [18]. A PN is a directed graph with two
types of nodes: places, shown as circles; and transitions, drawn as bars. The nodes are connected by arcs, which
link a place to a transition or vice-versa. A place can have a discrete number of tokens and the distribution of tokens
within places defines the PN marking, which represents the state of the modelled system at any point in time. The
system state changes as tokens are moved between, created in or removed from places as transitions fire. In order
to fire, a transition must first be enabled, which occurs when each input place contains a number of tokens that is
no less than the weight of the arc linking the place to the transition. An immediate transition, represented by a solid
bar, fires as soon as it is enabled. A timed transition, represented by a hollow bar, fires after a certain delay has
elapsed. This firing delay can either be fixed or randomly sampled from a known probability distribution as the
transition is enabled. When a transition fires, a number of tokens equivalent to the associated arc weight is removed
from each input place and added to each output place.
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the enabling and firing of a timed transition. The transition consists of three input
places and three output places where the place linked with a double-headed arc is both an input and output. The
place linked by an inhibitor arc, drawn with a circle at its head instead of an arrow, prohibits the firing of a transition
if the number of tokens within it is no less than the weight of the inhibitor arc. In Figure 1, the transition is enabled
and fires after a time delay t, removing tokens from the input places and adding tokens to the output places according
to the associated arc weight. By contrast, in Figure 2, the transition is disabled due to the token in the place linked
by the inhibitor arc.
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Figure 1. Transition enabling and firing. Figure 2. Inhibitor arc prevents transition firing.
Created by Jensen and Kristensen [7], coloured Petri nets (CPN) extend PN by allowing the behaviour of complex
systems, especially concurrent systems, to be concisely specified and modelled. In contrast to a PN, tokens in a
CPN are distinguished by token colours. The token colour is a label that can represent different data types, such as
Boolean, integer or character strings. Each place is assigned a colour set, which holds the possible token colours of
a specified type. Each arc is assigned an arc expression, which determines the amount of tokens of specific colours
that are removed from or added to the linked place when a transition fires. Each transition is assigned a guard,
which is a Boolean expression that represents a constraint on its enabling policy.
A transition is enabled only if the marking of each input place satisfies the associated input arc expression and its
guard evaluates to be true. Transitions can fire tokens of different colours in different ways and the colour of a token
can change after it passes through a transition as decided by a specific modelling condition. Figure 3 shows an
instance of transition enabling and firing for a CPN. All places in Figure 3 have the same colour set CS = {green,
red, blue}. cs1, cs2 and cs3 are colour variables that belong to CS. The arc expression shown as cs1, cs2 or cs3 indicates
one token of a specified colour from the colour set, while cs1+cs2 represents two coloured tokens. The transition
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guard, cs1= cs2≠ cs3, indicates that tokens in the two input places can be switched by the transition only if they have
the same colour and there is no token with the same colour in the place linked by the inhibitor arc. The delay times
associated with the firing of green, red and blue tokens by the transition are respectively t1, t2 and t3 and t1< t2< t3.
After a delay time t1, the transition moves the green tokens from its input places to the output place. After a further
delay of t2 - t1 the transition moves the red tokens. The firing of the transition for the blue tokens is disabled because
of the blue token in the input place linked by the inhibitor arc.
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Figure 3. Transition fires tokens with different switching time
Volovoi [9] introduces aging tokens as an extension to CPNs, which assign a label that acts as a ‘counter’ to each
token in a place. A token counter can change continuously while it contributes to the enabling of the transition. The
changing of the token counter is interrupted when the transition is disabled. Aging tokens are potentially useful for
modelling aircraft operation processes. By using a timed transition to represent the failure process of a component,
the token counter can be used to represent the remaining working life (time to failure) of the component if it can
only fail during operation. The token counter decreases when the component is operational, a process which stops
when the component is not operational. The timed transition fires when the counter reaches 0, indicating that its
remaining life has declined to 0 and that it has failed.
A hierarchical CPN (HCPN) is a CPN that is organised as a set of modules, which are linked by a number of
interfaces [7]. A module can be a non-hierarchical CPN or a HCPN with its own sub-modules. Module interfaces
consist of port places, substitution transitions and socket places. Different modules are connected by exchanging
tokens through ports. A module can import tokens via input ports and export tokens via output ports. A port can be
both an input and an output port so that the module can use it to both import and export tokens.
A module and its sub-modules are related by substitution transitions and socket places. A substitution transition,
drawn as a rectangular box in this paper, represents an abstract view of a module to its parent module, with the sub-
module giving a detailed view of the substitution transition’s function. The places linking a substitution transition
to its parent module are called sockets and are the substitution transition’s interfaces.
To achieve a complete hierarchy, it is necessary to identify the port-socket relation which shows how the ports of
a sub-module are related to the sockets of its substitution transition. When a port and a socket are related, they
conceptually become a single compound place and hence they always share the same marking. Figure 4 shows an
example HCPN with one substitution transition, for which places P1 and P2 are respectively an input socket and an
output socket. The substitution transition represents a sub-module that is a non-hierarchical CPN with two
transitions. The input port and output port of the sub-module CPN are respectively P1 and P2, which are related to
the socket places with the same names in the HCPN.
There are clear benefits to employing hierarchies in a CPN [7]. First, for complex systems such as aircraft, a single
non-hierarchical net would be very large and hard to construct, interpret and modify. Using modules allows more
convenient construction, interpretation and modification, since modules can be considered in isolation, which
should be simpler than having to account for the whole net. Secondly, a CPN module can be viewed as a black box
that allows modellers to work at different levels of abstraction without being concerned about the details within
modules.
The HCPN method is selected as the tool to model fleet cannibalisation because of its capability of providing a
graphical, precise and concise representation of the operation and maintenance processes of large, complex fleets.
With token colours, any number of platforms in the fleet can be represented by an equivalent number of tokens with
different colours in a single place, which means that the size of the HCPN model will not increase with the size of
the modelled fleet. With a modular structure, a HCPN model can be easily modified and extended to consider other
factors of fleet operation and maintenance when being applied to practical fleets.
Figure 4. Example hierarchical CPN
3. HCPN Model of Fleet Cannibalisation
In this section a HCPN model of fleet cannibalisation is presented. Cannibalisation is generally applied to fleets of
identical platforms such as military vehicles, buses or trains, which are used to perform missions so long as they are
mission capable, meaning that component failures on the platforms will not prevent them from performing the tasks
required to complete the mission. The model presented here is described in relation to an aircraft fleet but could
equally be applied to other, similar fleets with little or no amendment.
Due to the stochastic nature of fleet maintenance processes, calculating fleet performance using an analytical
solution of the HCPN model is impossible. However, the HCPN model provides an ideal framework for a Monte
Carlo simulation analysis. Such an analysis is demonstrated for an example fleet in Section 4.
3.1 Fleet Description
A fleet is assumed to be comprised of a number of identical and independent platforms, each of which contains a
number of different repairable components. Components and platforms have binary states. A platform can be either
mission-capable (MC) or non-mission-capable (NMC), while a component can be either working or failed.
Components (hence platforms) can only fail during operation. When a mission is called, the fleet manager will
assign MC platforms to perform it. The mission aborts if the number of idle, MC platforms in the fleet cannot meet
its requirement. Otherwise, the mission starts when the required number of platforms have been assigned. The
assigned platforms remain operational until the mission ends. An air mission abort happens when a platform
becomes NMC during operation. The platform will immediately be taken out of service and added to the ‘platform
maintenance queue’ (PMQ) which holds the NMC platforms that are required to be restored to the MC state.
Fleet maintenance is organised at three levels: O-level, I-level and D-level. NMC platforms are restored at the O-
level. If the PMQ contains more than one NMC platform, those platforms are maintained based on a queuing
discipline such as random selection, first in first out (FIFO) or last in first out (LIFO). When a platform is selected
to be restored, it is first checked whether there are enough spare components to replace its failed components. If so,
maintenance technicians take the required spares from stock and install them in the platform to restore it to the MC
state. Otherwise, technicians check cannibalisation birds for available working components of the required types if
the cannibalisation bird policy is used, removing the required components from birds and installing them in the
platform being maintained. Under the unrestricted cannibalisation policy technicians check other NMC platforms
to find the required working components. If these exist, unrestricted cannibalisation is performed from the selected
NMC platforms instead of cannibalisation birds. Both spare and cannibalised parts may be needed during a platform
restoration. Once restored, a platform can be assigned to perform scheduled missions. If there are insufficient spare
and cannibalised components to fully restore a NMC platform, the restoration will not begin and the NMC platform
will be added to the ‘platform waiting maintenance queue’ (PWMQ) which holds all NMC platforms for which the
existing resources do not allow complete restoration.
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All removed, failed components at O-level are sent for repair to the I-level repair shop, where there is a certain
probability that repair is possible. If repair is possible at I-level, I-level maintenance technicians will return it to the
working state. Otherwise, it is sent for repair at the depot. Component repair is assumed to be perfect. Manpower
limitations are not considered in this paper, meaning there are always sufficient maintenance personnel to perform
the required maintenance actions. The repaired components, forming the new spare part inventory, are returned to
the O-level maintenance organisation. If the PWMQ contains NMC platforms when new spares arrive, maintenance
technicians will check whether any platform in the PWMQ can be entirely restored using new and existing spares
and cannibalisation resources. If so, crews will perform the required spare installations and cannibalisations to
restore those platforms to the MC state. Otherwise, NMC platforms remain in the PWMQ until the required
resources become available.
3.2 Model Hierarchy
The HCPN cannibalisation model is made up of five modules:
 Fleet module - models fleet operation and the management of cannibalisation birds;
 Platform module - models platform failures;
 Component module - models component failures;
 Maintenance module - models fleet three-level maintenance processes under different cannibalisation
policies;
 Master module - top-level of the HCPN model which connects the other four modules to provide an abstract
view of fleet operation and maintenance processes.
The colour sets and colour variables applied in these modules are defined in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. For an
arbitrary variable c of colour set C, c(p), c(ct) and c(a) represent a platform, component type and remaining working
life, respectively. c(a) is initialised by sampling from a known distribution and decreases continuously when the
related component is in operation. A spare component of type ct is represented by (0, ct, a).
Table 1. Colour sets
Colour set Colours Meaning
P {1,2,…,NP} Platform
CT {1,2,…,NC} Component type
C {(p, ct, a)} Components: a≥0 is the expected working life of a component; p=0 means a spare component.
CRD
{(c, c1)}
∀c, c1∊C, c(ct)=c1(ct), c(p)0
and c(p)c1(p)
Component replacement decision: the failed component c is decided to be replaced by component c1.
c1(p)=0 means c will be replaced by a new spare component. c1(p)0 means that the working
component c1 is cannibalised from platform c1(p) to replace the failed component c in platform c(p).
M {1,2,…} Missions
PM {(p, m)}
∀p∊P, ∀m∊M Platform ݌ is assigned to perform mission m
CAP {‘CAB’, ‘URCA’, ‘NCA’} Cannibalisation policies: ‘CAB’ means cannibalisation birds; ‘URCA’ means unrestrictedcannibalisation; ‘NCA’ means no cannibalisation.
Table 2. Colour variables
Variable Colour Meaning
p, p1 P A platform
c, c1,…, cn C A component
crd CRD A component replacement decision
cap CAP A cannibalisation policy
m M A mission
pm PM A platform assignment decision
3.3 Fleet HCPN
The fleet module, shown in Figure 5, models the mission-oriented fleet operation and the management of
cannibalisation birds. It contains four sub-modules:
 Fleet mission scheduling (FMS): models the scheduling of fleet missions;
 Fleet mission assignment (FMA): models the assignment of a required number of idle, MC platforms to the
scheduled mission;
 Fleet mission operation (FMO): models the operation of assigned platforms under different cannibalisation
policies;
 Fleet cannibalisation bird (FCAB): models the selection of cannibalisation birds and cannibalisation
recovery.
Each sub-module is represented by a substitution transition with the same name. All places shown in the fleet
module are sockets for these substitution transitions. The meanings and port types of places in the fleet module are
listed in Table 3.
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Figure 5. Fleet HCPN module
Table 3. Meanings of places of fleet module
Place Meaning Colour Set Port type
PFMS Fleet missions M -
PMUS Mission under schedule M -
PMS Mission starts M -
PPMC Platforms that are mission-capable P Input/Output
PPNMC Platforms that are non-mission-capable P Input/Output
PPAM Platforms that are assigned to a mission PM -
PPPM Platforms that are performing missions PM Output
PPOG Platforms on ground P -
PCAP Cannibalisation policy CAP Input/Output
PPMQ Platform maintenance queue P Output
PE Event - Output
PCAB Cannibalisation bird P Input/Output
PCAR Cannibalisation recovery P Input/Output
PMGA Mission ground abort M Output
PMAA Mission air abort M Output
The place PFMS represents all the missions that the fleet is required to perform. When a mission is scheduled, the
FMS sub-module outputs a token representing that mission to the PMUS. This activates the FMA sub-module, which
assigns MC platforms to perform the mission. If there are insufficient idle, MC platforms (represented by tokens in
PPOG and PPMC) for the mission, it will be aborted and a token output to PMGA which holds all the cancelled missions.
Otherwise, the FMA sub-module outputs the assigned platforms to PPAM. The FMO sub-module governs the
operations of the assigned platforms. When a mission starts (represented by a token in PMS), tokens representing the
assigned platforms will be placed in PPPM, which is output to the component module to enable the failure processes
of components on those operating platforms. If an operating platform becomes NMC (represented by a token in
PPNMC), a mission air abort event happens with a token being output to PMAA. Meanwhile, the FMO sub-module
removes the token representing the NMC platform from PPPM and outputs it to both PPOG and PPMQ, indicating that
the platform is taken out of service and added to the PMQ. As this happens, a token is placed in PE if the fleet
employs the unrestricted cannibalisation policy, since new cannibalisation resources will be available. PCAP
represents the employed cannibalisation policy.
If the cannibalisation bird policy is employed, the FCAB sub-module selects a certain number (one or more) of idle,
MC platforms as birds. Tokens representing the selected birds are added to PCAB. Meanwhile a token is output to PE
since new cannibalisation resources are available. Those platforms will not be assigned to perform missions. After
being kept as a bird for a certain period of time, a platform is restored to the MC state and another bird selected.
The token representing the platform is removed from PCAB and copies of it placed in both PCAR and PPMQ indicating
that a cannibalisation recovery has begun.
The FMS sub-module is shown in Figure 6. Places PFMS and PMUS are respectively an input and an output port and
are equivalent to the socket places with the same names in the fleet module. The transition TFMS, governs the setting
of the scheduled mission start times that are represented by the firing delays of tokens in PFMS.
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Figure 6. FMS sub-module.
The FMA sub-module is shown in Figure 7. Places PMS and PMGA are output ports; PMUS is an input port; all other
places are input/output ports. Each port place represents the socket place with the same name in the fleet module.
Transition TFMA assigns MC platforms when a mission is scheduled. Nm represents the number of MC platforms
required by a mission m. After Nm platforms have been assigned to mission m by TFMA, TFMA is inhibited and TMS is
enabled. TMS moves the token with colour m from PMUS to PMS immediately, signifying that mission m starts. If there
are more than Nm idle, MC platforms when mission m is called, a selection discipline may be applied by the fleet
manager in order to select Nm platforms. A mission is often required to start within a certain time of being scheduled.
It will be cancelled if the number of assigned platforms cannot meet the mission’s requirement during the
assignment time window for the mission. When this happens, TMGA removes the token from PMUS and places it in
PMGA, stating that a mission ground abort event happens. Meanwhile, the pre-assigned platforms for the aborted
mission are returned to the idle state by TCMAP so that they can be assigned to other missions.
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Figure 7. FMA sub-module
The FMO sub-module is shown in Figure 8. Places PPAM and PMS are input ports; PPOG, PPMQ, PMAA and PE are output
ports; and PCAP, PPNMC and PPPM are input/output ports. When a scheduled mission m begins (represented by a token
with colour m in PMS), the assigned platforms will start to perform it, a situation modelled by TPSPM moving tokens
representing those platforms from PPAM to PPPM. This enables TPPM which assigns a delay time (either fixed or
randomly sampled from a distribution) to each token in PPPM according to the required operating time of an assigned
platform during the mission. If an air abort event happens (a MC platform p becomes NMC during the mission),
either TMAAB or TMAAU will take the platform p out of service (PPOG), add it to the PMQ (PPMQ) and report the air abort
event (PMAA), based on the cannibalisation policy applied (PCAP). TMAAB is responsible for handling the air abort
events if the cannibalisation bird or no cannibalisation policy is employed and TMAAU if an unrestricted
cannibalisation policy is employed. Since new NMC platforms mean new cannibalisation sources under unrestricted
cannibalisation, a token is created in PE after TMAAU fires. After an assigned platform successfully completes the
mission, TPPM fires, switching the platform from PPPM to PPOG. A mission ends when all the assigned platforms land,
with the related token moved from PMS to PME by TME.
Figure 8. FMO sub-module
The FCAB sub-module is shown in Figure 9. Places PPOG, PPMC, PCAP, PCAB and PCAR are input/output ports and PE
and PPMQ are output ports. Under the cannibalisation bird policy, the fleet keeps one or more MC platform grounded
as primary cannibalisation sources. In order to avoid platforms staying grounded for too long a period of time, it is
assumed that only MC platforms can be selected as cannibalisation birds. The selection of the cannibalisation birds
is governed by the transition TSCAB, which places the required number (NCAB) of selected cannibalisation birds in
PCAB. After having been used as a cannibalisation bird for a certain period of time, a platform is added by TCAR to
the PMQ (PPMQ) to be maintained, after which TSCAB selects a new bird. Meanwhile, any NMC platforms in the
PWMQ are checked for the possibility of restoration since new cannibalisation resources became available. After
restoration, TCARF returns platforms that have undergone cannibalisation recovery (tokens in PCAR) to PPOG.
Figure 9. FCAB sub-module.
3.4 Platform Module
The platform module models the process of platform failures, whose failure logic can be represented by fault trees
(FTs). A FT models a particular system failure mode, represented by its top event, whose causes are developed
using logic gates, intermediate events and basic events, which usually represent component failure [11]. Figure 10
shows an example platform FT with ten basic events, C1-C10, four intermediate events, S1-S4 and five logic gates,
G1-G5 (G1 and G2 are examples of OR and AND gates respectively).
Figure 11 shows the platform module that is equivalent to the example FT shown in Figure 10. All basic events are
represented by the place PCF with colour set C while each intermediate or top event is represented by a place with
colour P. An AND gate is represented by an immediate transition and each OR gate is converted to a number of
immediate transitions equal to the number of converted places of the gate’s input events. If component failures lead
to the failure of a MC platform p, a token with colour p will be placed in PTOP. This enables TPNMC, which will
change the state of the platform to NMC through switching the token with colour p from PPMC to PPNMC. Since
cannibalisation birds do not perform missions, the state of MC platforms is immediately changed to NMC by TBNMC
once they are selected as cannibalisation birds. When a NMC platform p is restored (PPR contains a token with
colour p), its state will be changed to MC by TPMC and the intermediate events of the restored platform will be
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cleared by the transitions linking PPR and the places representing the existence of the fault tree intermediate and top
events.
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Figure 10. Example platform fault tree.
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Figure 11. Example platform module.
The different failure modes of a platform can each be represented by a fault tree. A HCPN model (as shown in
Figure 11) is needed for each fault tree. Figure 12 shows the platform module for platforms with N failure modes,
where each substitution transition represents a module for each failure mode.
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Figure 12. Platform module with multiple failure modes.
3.5 Component Module
The component module represents the component failure process. It is assumed that the component time to failure
follows a known distribution and a component can fail only during operation of the platform to which it is fitted.
Figure 13 shows the component module in which PCF is an output port, PCW is an input port and PPPM is an
input/output port.
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Figure 13. Component module.
The failure process of a working component c on platform p is activated when the platform starts to perform a
mission (PPPM contains a token with colour pm such that pm(p)=p)). TCF then assigns a delay time equal to c(a), the
remaining working life of component c, to the associated token in PCW. c(a) is initialised by randomly sampling
from a known probability distribution relating to the component failure time and continuously decreases when TCF
is enabled by component c. Since component c can only fail during operation, the component failure process can
be interrupted once the mission ends due to its completion or the platform becoming NMC. When this happens, the
component remaining life, c(a), stops decreasing. If component c fails before platform p finishes the current mission
(PPPM is still marked with token pm when c(a) reaches 0), TCF will switch the token c from PCW to PCF, indicating
that component c fails.
3.6 Maintenance Module
The maintenance module, shown in Figure 14, models the process of three-level fleet maintenance considering
different cannibalisation policies. It contains three sub-modules: O-level (OM), I-level (IM) and D-level
maintenance (DM), and takes PSCI, PCAB, PCAR, PCAP and PCW as input/output ports, PE, PPMQ and PCF as input ports
and PPR as an output port. Places PICMQ and PDCMQ respectively represent the removed, failed components that have
been sent to the I-level and D-level maintenance organisations. PCAN counts the cannibalisation actions performed.
PSCI and PNS represent the spare component inventories and repaired components that are returned to the fleet,
respectively. Each of the substitution transitions OM, IM and DM represents a sub-module with the same name.
The OM sub-module governs the restoration of NMC platforms (represented by tokens in the place PPMQ) at the O-
level maintenance organisation. When a platform is being maintained, maintenance crews will replace its failed
components (represented by tokens in PCF) by spares or through cannibalisation. After all failed components have
been replaced, the OM sub-module outputs a token representing the restored platform to the place PPR. After removal,
failed components are output to the place PICMQ so that repair can be attempted in the IM sub-module. If a failed
component is non-repairable at the I-level maintenance organisation the IM sub-module will output a token
representing it to PDCMQ and it will be repaired in the DM sub-module. After repair at either I-level or D-level,
repaired components are returned to the fleet through PNS which forms the new spare inventory.
Figure 14. Maintenance module.
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3.6.1 O-level Maintenance
The OM sub-module models platform restoration processes including: selection of NMC platforms to maintain,
selection of spare or cannibalised components to restore the selected NMC platform, implementation of component
replacement decisions, as well as management of spare inventories and cannibalisation resources under different
cannibalisation policies. Figure 15 shows the OM sub-module, which is itself made up of five sub-modules:
 Platform restoration queuing (PRQ)
 Component replacement decision (CRD),
 O-level maintenance actions (OMA),
 Cannibalisation inventory control (CAIC),
 Spare inventory control (SIC),
which are shown in Figures 16-20. PPMQ, PCF, PNS and PE are input ports, PPR and PICMQ are output ports, PCAP, PCAB,
PCAR and PCW are input/output ports. The meanings of places in the OM sub-module are listed in Table 4.
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Figure 15. OM sub-module.
The restoration sequence of NMC platforms in the PMQ is decided in the PRQ sub-module based on the queuing
discipline specified by the fleet manager. When a platform is selected for restoration, the PRQ sub-module outputs
a token representing it to PSPR. The platform is then checked for the possibility of full restoration using the existing
spare and cannibalisation resources (respectively represented by tokens in PSCI and PCAI) in the CRD sub-module.
Table 4. Meanings of places of OM sub-module
Place Meaning Colour Place Meaning Colour
PPUM Platforms undergoing maintenance P PCCAQ
Component cannibalisation queue
(working components that are selected
to be cannibalised)
C
PCAI
Component cannibalisation inventory
(working components that can be
cannibalised)
C PSCI Spare component inventory (availablespare components in the fleet) C
PPWMQ Platform waiting maintenance queue P PSID Spare installation decision CRD
PSPR Platform selected for restoration P PCAD Cannibalisation decision CRD
஼ܲோ௉ொ
Component replacement queue (components
to be replaced during maintenance) C PSSC Selected spare component C
If the selected platform cannot be fully restored, it will be output to PPWMQ to wait for available resources. Otherwise,
the CRD sub-module outputs the platform to PPUM, which holds the platforms being maintained. Meanwhile, the
spare replacement decision and specific selected spares will be output to PSID and PSSC respectively. If
cannibalisation is also used, the CRD sub-module will add the cannibalisation replacement decision and selected
cannibalised working components to PCAD and PCCAQ respectively. The OMA sub-module acts according to the
specified component replacement decisions. Failed components are removed and replaced by the selected spare or
cannibalised components. Removed, failed components are output to PICMQ for I-level repair. Once all failed
components have been replaced, the platform is restored and output to PPR by the CRD sub-module.
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Figure 16 OMA sub-module.
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Figure 17. PRQ sub-module.
Figure 18. CAIC sub-module.
When repaired components are returned to the fleet (represented by tokens in PNS), the SIC sub-module adds them
to PSCI, the spare component inventory. An event token will also be placed in PE to initialise the restoration check
of NMC platforms within the PWMQ in the CRD sub-module.
The available component cannibalisation resources are managed in the CAIC sub-module and differ according to
the cannibalisation policy employed. They are working components from cannibalisation birds under the
cannibalisation bird policy and those from NMC platforms when unrestricted cannibalisation is employed. If
cannibalisation is allowed, the available cannibalisation resources are added to PCAI (the component cannibalisation
inventory) and are removed from the inventory when the platforms to which they are fitted are being maintained or
undergoing cannibalisation recovery.
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Figure 19. CRD sub-module.
Figure 20. SIC sub-module.
3.6.2 I-level Maintenance
The IM sub-module models the repair of failed components at the I-level maintenance organisation. When a failed
component arrives at I-level, it will first be checked to see whether repair is possible here. If so, I-level maintenance
technicians repair it and return it to the fleet base as a new spare. Otherwise, it is sent to the depot for repair. Figure
21 shows the IM sub-module in which PICMQ is an input port and PDCMQ and PNS are output ports.
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Figure 21. IM sub-module.
pc(ct) represents the probability that a component c can be repaired at the I-level repair shop. When a failed
component arrives (a token with colour c is added to PICMQ), a variable r will be randomly sampled from the range
0 to 1. If r<pc(ct), TSICRQ is enabled and fires immediately, moving the token with colour c from PICMQ to PIFCRQ,
signifying that the component is repairable at the I-level. Otherwise, the token is moved immediately from PICMQ to
PFCTD by TSDCRQ and sent to the depot maintenance queue (PDCMQ) by TTID. The repair of failed components at I-level
is governed by the transition TIRFC whose associated firing delays represent component repair times. After repair,
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TIRFC outputs the perfectly repaired components to PIRC (represented by tokens with colour (0, ct, a) where a is
randomly sampled from a known probability distribution relating to the component failure time). These new spares
are then returned to the O-level maintenance organisation by TTIO.
If the fleet maintenance is organised at two levels and there is no I-level maintenance organisation, instead of
excluding the IM module from the maintenance module, pC, the I-level repair probability, is set to zero for all
components along with the firing delays of TTIO and TTOI (in the OMA sub-module), so that all failed components
are sent to the depot after removal at the O-level maintenance organisation.
3.6.3 D-level Maintenance
The DM sub-module, shown in Figure 22, models depot repairs of failed components that are sent from the I-level
maintenance organisation. In this module, PDCMQ is an input port and PNS is an output port. Note that all components
are assumed to be repairable at the depot. Failed components that arrive at the depot will first be repaired by TDRC
to the ‘as good as new’ state and then sent back to the O-level through the firing of TTDO.
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Figure 22. DM sub-module.
3.7 Master Module
The master module, shown in Figure 23, is the top-level module which provides an abstract view of fleet operation
and maintenance. This module consists of four substitution transitions representing the HCPN module with the
same name and has three main functions.
Figure 23. Master module.
The first is to show the token exchanges between fleet, platform, component and maintenance modules through
their ports. The second is to initialise the whole model by setting the initial marking of places PFMS, PCAP, PPMC, PCW
and PSCI, representing the total fleet missions, the cannibalisation policy, the number of platforms in a fleet, the
number and types of components within a platform and the initial amount of spares for each component type. The
third is to collect the data which is needed for the calculation of fleet performance measures.
3.8 Model Operation
A HCPN model has been built to describe the mission-oriented fleet operation and three-level maintenance
processes under multiple cannibalisation policies. As shown in Figure 24, it is made up of 17 modules that are
organised into 4 levels. The master module lies on top, providing an abstract view of fleet operation and maintenance
processes and acting as the user interface. Model users can study their fleet of interest by setting the marking of
appropriate places in the master module with no need for further modification of the whole HCPN model. The
model outputs to the master module the information needed for the calculation of fleet performance measures, which
can support fleet managers in making cannibalisation and maintenance related decisions.
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Figure 24. Module hierarchy.
3.8.1. Model Input
To use the HCPN model to investigate a fleet, it must first be initialised through the input of the fleet parameters:
 Fleet operational requirements: the number of missions required each day, the start time, assignment time
window and length of each mission, and the discipline of mission assignment (how MC platforms are
selected to perform scheduled missions);
 Fleet size: the number of platforms in the fleet;
 Platform structure: the number of components in a platform, platform failure modes and the associated fault
trees;
 Component failure characteristics: the probability distribution describing the time to failure of each
component type;
 Maintenance policies: the cannibalisation strategy (no cannibalisation, unrestricted cannibalisation or the
cannibalisation bird policy), disciplines of platform restoration queuing and the selection of cannibalisation
sources, the number of cannibalisation birds simultaneously used and the length of time a platform is kept
as a bird under the cannibalisation bird policy;
 Maintenance resources: the number of spares for each type of component;
 Maintenance activities: the removal time, installation time, repair time and repair probability at the I-level
maintenance organisation for each type of component, and the transportation time between different
maintenance organisations.
The fleet parameters are input by setting the initial marking (the number and colours of tokens) of their related
places and transition firing delays. For instance, cannibalisation policy is governed by the marking of PCAP in the
master module (Figure 23). When no cannibalisation is allowed, PCAP contains a token with colour cap=‘NCA’,
while the token colour is ‘URCA’ or ‘CAB’ under the unrestricted and cannibalisation bird policies respectively.
The length of time that a platform remains a bird is equal to the firing delay of TCAP in the FCAB sub-module (Figure
9). Tables 5 and 6 respectively list the places and transitions that must be initialised and the associated fleet input
parameters represented by the place markings and transition firing delays.
In addition, a different module must be built for each platform failure mode by converting the related fault tree to a
HCPN, which further corresponds to a substitution transition in the platform module (Figure 12). The platform
restoration queuing and selection of cannibalisation resources are respectively governed by the transition TSP in the
PRQ sub-module (Figure 17) and the transition TPCAD in the CRD sub-module (Figure 19), which fire tokens in their
input places according to the order determined by the selected disciplines. The mission assignment discipline is
governed by the transition TFMA in the FMA sub-module (Figure 7). The selection of cannibalisation birds is
governed by TSCAB in the FCAB sub-module (Figure 9). The number of cannibalisation birds, the required number
of MC platforms to perform a scheduled mission and the I-level repair rates of failed components are respectively
governed by the arc expressions of the inhibitor arc linking PCAB to TSCAB in the FCAB sub-module, the inhibitor arc
linking PPAM to TFMA in the FMA sub-module and the input arc linking PICMQ to TSICRQ in the IM sub-module (Figure
21).
Table 5. Input parameters represented by place marking
Place Module Input parameter
PPMS Master The total number of required missions
PPMC Master The total number and indices of platforms in the fleet
PCW Master The total number and indices of components in platforms
PCAP Master The cannibalisation policy
PSCI Master The number of spares for each type of component
Table 6. Input parameters represented by transition firing delays
Transition Module Input parameter
TFMS FMS The start time of each mission
TMGA FMA The assignment time window of each mission
TPPM FMO The length of each mission
TCAR FCAB The length of bird life
TCF Component Component failure time
TRFC OMA Removal time of failed components
TRWC OMA Removal time of cannibalised components
TISC OMA Installation time of spare components
TIWC OMA Installation time of cannibalised components
TIRFC IM Component repair time at the I-level
TIRFC DM Component repair time at the D-level
TTOI OMA The transportation time from the O-level to I-level
TTIO IM The transportation time from the I-level to O-level
TTID IM The transportation time from the I-level to D-level
TTDO DM The transportation time from the D-level to O-level
3.8.2 Model Output
After the characteristics of all places, transitions and arcs of the HCPN model haven been identified for the modelled
fleet, the initialised model can be used as a framework for a Monte Carlo simulation analysis of the modelled fleet
to obtain its performance.
Four indicators are used in this paper to measure the fleet performance: mission capable rate (MCR), mission abort
rate (MAR), cannibalisation rate (CAR) and maintenance cost.
The MCR is defined as the proportion of time that platforms in the fleet are capable of performing missions in a
given time interval and is given by [15]:
MCR =
total MC hours
Total possessed hours×100% (1)
The MC hours and possessed hours are respectively the cumulative time (in hours) that platforms are in the MC
state and the total time (in hours) that platforms are possessed by the fleet. MCR is a positive indicator which means
that higher values indicate better fleet performance.
The MAR can be used to measure both reliability and maintenance performance. This is a negative indicator (lower
values indicate better performance) since it represents the number of missions aborted due to reliability and
maintenance problems. Since missions can be aborted from the ground abort or air, the abort rate takes account of
both and is defined as [15]:
MAR =
Air aborts + Ground aborts
Total missions required ×100% (2)
The mission ground abort rate (MGAR) and mission air abort rate (MAAR) can also be calculated:
MGAR =
Ground aborts
Total missions required×100% (3)
MAAR =
Air aborts
Total missions required×100% (4)
CAR is a negative measure which indicates the number of cannibalisations performed per 100 missions [15]:
CAR =
Total cannibalisations
Total missions performed×100 (5)
The number of cannibalisations performed, the number of ground abort events and the number of air abort events
during the fleet’s lifetime are respectively equal to the number of tokens in PCAN, PMGA and PMAA. A platform’s total
MC hours is recorded by the length of time the related token stays in PPMC. Maintenance expenditure consists of
costs associated with platform failures, technician wages and spare acquisition and holding costs. The total man-
power hours for repairs is equivalent to the sum of sampled delay times of TIRFC and TDRFC, while those for removals
and installations are respectively obtained by adding the total sampled firing delays of TRFC and TRWC (renewals),
and TISC and TIWC (installations). The fleet MAR (MAAR and MGAR), CAR, MCR and maintenance cost are
calculated using the collected information and equations 1-5.
3.8.3 Model Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation uses repeated random sampling and statistical analysis to obtain the required fleet
performance [16]. Performing a Monte Carlo simulation needs a computer model to govern the enabling and firing
processes of transitions within the HCPN model, which indicates the occurrence of all possible events relating to
the fleet operation and maintenance processes such as component failures, repairs, removals and installations.
Bespoke C# software was developed to encode the simulation model. The software takes in the required fleet
parameters in Excel-file format and uses them to set the relevant place markings, arc expressions and distributions
to generate the transition firing delays and structure of the platform module. The program then automatically
produces the different modules mentioned above and connects them in order to produce the complete net.
In order to obtain the required fleet performance measures, the software simulates the produced net for a given
period of time. During the simulations, a time for each transition to switch can be obtained by randomly sampling
from the relevant probability distribution. For example, if a timed transition is governed by a Weibull distribution
with scale parameter η and shape parameter β, for which the cumulative distribution function (CDF), F(t), is:
F (t) = 1 - exp [-(
t
η
)β] (6)
then using a random number x sampled from the U[0,1] distribution, the transition firing time can be calculated
using the expression:
t = η[-ln(x)]1/β                                                                                                                       (7)
Numerical algorithms may be used if a probability distribution does not have an analytical inverse function, for
example the central limit theorem can be used to sample from a Normal distribution [17]. The simulation program
runs for a specified number (assumed to be NS) of simulations as follows:
Step 1. Set the simulation clock to 0;
Step 2. Find the enabled immediate transitions and switch them;
Step 3. Repeat step 2 until no more immediate transitions are enabled;
Step 4. Search through each timed transition and sample firing delays for enabled transitions;
Step 5. Switch the timed transition with the earliest firing delay and push the simulation clock to the current
simulation time;
Step 6. If the simulation clock reaches the given threshold, the current simulation is complete – go to step 7,
else go to step 2;
Step 7. If the number of simulations completed< NS, go to step 1, else end.
The information for calculating the performance measures is collected during the simulation and statistics of the NS
simulations are output to Excel files to analyse the overall fleet performance. The confidence level of the
simulation results depends on the number of simulations. Running a large number of simulations will lead to more
accurate results, but could be time-consuming [18]. The results are converged when carrying out further simulations
does not make significant changes to the model results. A large number of simulations may be unnecessary if the
results reach a desired level of convergence, a threshold for which can be specified [18]. In this paper, convergence
is considered to occur when the changes in the simulation results are less than 1%, which was found to be achieved
by running more than 100 simulations.
3.8.4 Model Capability
The HCPN model can concisely model different fleets and provides an ideal framework for Monte Carlo simulation,
and hence provides a tool for fleet managers to:
 Estimate and predict fleet performance. Given fleet characteristics including fleet size, platform configuration,
operational requirements, component failure characteristics, times relating to maintenance actions, available
maintenance resources and the applied maintenance policies, the HCPN models can be used to obtain the fleet
performance measures required by fleet managers;
 Select the maintenance strategy. The HCPN model can be adapted to model different aspects of fleet operation
and maintenance, allowing fleet managers to study and compare the effects on fleet performance of different
maintenance policies such as cannibalisation polices and platform restoration queuing disciplines, and address
their strengths and weaknesses without modification of the whole model. This feature ensures that maintenance
policies can be easily evaluated and selected by fleet managers according to their maintenance management
objectives;
 Optimise the implementation of the selected maintenance strategy. The performance of a maintenance policy
such as unrestricted cannibalisation may be affected by a variety of factors such as fleet operational
requirements and spare inventories, which can vary with time. With the capability of analysing the effects of
fleet factors on the selected maintenance strategy, the HCPN model can help fleet managers determine how best
to implement the selected maintenance strategy;
 Manage the maintenance logistics system. Due to the flexibility of the HCPN model, different spare provision
scenarios can be easily compared based on their effects on fleet performance, which can help to direct the
provision of spare inventories;
 Direct the design of the fleet maintenance system. Since the HCPN model can represent different fleet
maintenance systems that vary according to the number of maintenance shops and the distance between them,
it can be used to help fleet managers determine the organisation and locations of the available maintenance
facilities through the comparisons of fleet performance under different scenarios.
4. Application to a Simple Fleet
To demonstrate the application of the HCPN model, an example fleet is considered which consists of 50 identical
and independent platforms, each of which comprises 10 components connected in series. The fleet is assumed to
perform fixed, identical, daily missions for 5 years. 45 missions must be performed by the fleet each day. Each
mission is performed by one MC platform, starting at 8 am and lasting 16 hours. The assignment time window for
each mission is 15 minutes. Thus, the total number of missions that must be performed by the fleet is 82125 in the
5 years.
Table 7 shows the distributions of component failure time, removal/install time and repair time, the I-level repair
probability for each type of component and the spare costs. The time taken to transport components between
different maintenance organisations is included in the repair time. When a mission is called, if the number of MC
platforms in the fleet exceeds the mission requirements, the required number of MC platforms is randomly selected
to perform the mission. The random selection discipline is also applied to platform restoration queuing, selection of
cannibalisation birds under the cannibalisation bird policy, and selection of NMC platforms to cannibalise from
under the unrestricted cannibalisation policy. Each air abort event and ground abort event are assumed to have fixed
$300 and $150 costs respectively. The hourly wage for component removal/installation is $30 while that for repair
is $55.
First the effects of the unrestricted cannibalisation and cannibalisation bird policy on fleet performance are
evaluated using the reliability- and operation-related performance measures introduced above, along with an
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of different cannibalisation policies. Then two decision variables relating
to the cannibalisation bird policy, the number of birds and the length of bird life, are investigated using the HCPN
model.
Table 7. Example fleet parameters
Component Failure time
I-level
Repair
probability
Remove
time
(hour)
I-level Repair
time
(hour)
D-level Repair
time
(hour)
Install time
(hour)
Spare
acquisition
cost ($) Annualholdingcost ($)
1 Weibull
(β=1.3, η=2300) 
0.8 Triangle(3,4,5)
Uniform
(120,130)
Uniform
(150,160)
Triangle
(4,5,6) 250000 5000
2 Normal
(µ=1900,σ=23) 
0.7 Uniform(5.5,6.5)
Uniform
(75,80)
Uniform
(115,125)
Uniform
(6,8) 500000 8000
3 Lognormal,
(µ=7.6,σ=0.8) 
0.9 Triangle(4,5,6)
Uniform
(135,145)
Uniform
(165,175)
Triangle
(6,6.5,7) 220000 6500
4 Weibull
(β=2.0, η =1950) 
0.75 Triangle(3,4.5,5.5)
Triangle
(95,100,105)
Triangle
(115,120,135)
Triangle
(4,5.5,6) 330000 5500
5 Weibull
(β=2.5, η =2500) 
0.85 Triangle(3.5,4.5,6)
Triangle
(120,130,135)
Triangle
(170,180,195)
Triangle
(3,4,4.5) 200000 3000
6 Weibull
(β=1.4, η =2100) 
0.8 Uniform(4.5,5.5)
Triangle
(80,86,90)
Triangle
(120,136,140)
Uniform
(4,5) 460000 3800
7 Weibull
(β=1.8, η =1800) 
0.7 Uniform(5,5.5)
Triangle
(130,140,150)
Triangle
(160,170,180)
Uniform
(5.5,6.5) 350000 7000
8 Weibull
(β=1.7, η =2300) 
0.9 Uniform(3,3.5)
Triangle
(120,128,135)
Triangle
(150,158,165)
Uniform
(4,4.5) 400000 2000
9 Normal
(µ=2100,σ=18) 
0.75 Triangle(2,3.5,4)
Uniform
(150,160)
Uniform
(185,195)
Triangle
(3.5,4,4.5) 430000 2900
10 Weibull
(β=1.5, η =2450) 
0.85 Triangle(3,3.5,4)
Uniform
(160,168)
Uniform
(195,210)
Triangle
(3.2,3.8,4.2) 600000 5200
4.1 Evaluating the Effect of Cannibalisation on Fleet Performance
When the cannibalisation bird policy is applied, it is assumed that the fleet only uses one cannibalisation bird at a
time and a bird will be used for 30 days before its cannibalisation recovery starts. To evaluate and compare the
effects of different cannibalisation policies on fleet performance, six scenarios are studied using the HCPN model:
 Scenario 1: no cannibalisation, no spares;
 Scenario 2: one cannibalisation bird, no spares;
 Scenario 3: no cannibalisation, one spare for each component;
 Scenario 4: one cannibalisation bird, one spare for each component;
 Scenario 5: unrestricted cannibalisation, no spare;
 Scenario 6: unrestricted cannibalisation, one spare for each component.
Figures 25 and 26 respectively show the changes of average fleet MCR and MAAR under different cannibalisation
policies with the number of simulation performed when spares are not available. It can be seen that good
convergence of the fleet performance measured by either indicator is achieved when more than 100 simulations are
performed. The same conclusion is also achieved for other indicators and scenarios studied in this paper. To
guarantee the accuracy of simulation results, 200 simulations are carried out for each scenario.
Table 8 summarises the associated fleet performance under the different cannibalisation and spare provisioning
scenarios. The simulation results show that, for the modelled fleet, performing cannibalisation can improve the fleet
performance no matter whether spares are available or not. When spares are unavailable, using one cannibalisation
bird (scenario 2) or unrestricted cannibalisation (scenario 5) can respectively increase the fleet MCR by 20.6% and
24.3% while decreasing the MGAR by 76.3% and 89.4% when compared to scenario 1. However, these respectively
bring 14.7% and 19.3% increases in the maintenance cost and the MAAR also respectively increases by 20.3% and
23.7%. When there is one spare for each type of component, using one cannibalisation bird (scenario 4) and
unrestricted cannibalisation (scenario 6) cause the fleet MCR to respectively increase by 8.2% and 10.9%, with
66.0% and 84.0% decreases in MGAR when compared to the case where cannibalisation is not allowed (scenario
3). However, the MAAR increases by 7.5% and 9.0% respectively.
Figure 25. Convergence of average fleet MCR under different cannibalisation policies when spares are unavailable
Figure 26. Convergence of average fleet MAAR under different cannibalisation policies when spares are unavailable
Table 8. Fleet performance
Fleet Performance Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
MCR
Average 70.5% 85.0% 80.8% 87.4% 87.6% 89.6%
Maximum simulated 70.9% 85.7% 81.4% 87.9% 88.0% 89.9%
Minimum simulated 69.9% 84.4% 80.4% 86.9% 87.3% 89.4%
Standard deviation 0.19% 0.24% 0.17% 0.18% 0.13% 0.13%
MAR
Average 26.6% 12.0% 16.1% 10.4% 9.5% 8.8%
Maximum simulated 27.3% 12.6% 16.5% 10.9% 9.7% 9.1%
Minimum simulated 26.0% 11.2% 15.5% 10.0% 9.1% 8.5%
Standard deviation 0.24% 0.24% 0.20% 0.17% 0.13% 0.14%
MGAR
Average 20.7% 4.9% 9.4% 3.2% 2.2% 1.5%
Maximum simulated 21.3% 5.6% 9.7% 3.7% 2.5% 1.8%
Minimum simulated 20.2% 4.0% 8.9% 2.7% 1.8% 1.2%
Standard deviation 0.21% 0.25% 0.18% 0.17% 0.13% 0.14%
MAAR
Average 5.9% 7.1% 6.7% 7.2% 7.3% 7.3%
Maximum simulated 6.0% 7.2% 6.8% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4%
Minimum simulated 5.8% 6.9% 6.6% 7.1% 7.1% 7.2%
Standard deviation 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
CAR
Average 0 0.74 0 0.71 4.02 2.46
Maximum simulated 0 0.76 0 0.73 4.24 2.62
Minimum simulated 0 0.72 0 0.69 3.75 2.32
Standard deviation 0 0.005 0 0.006 0.095 0.069
Cost($k)
Average 38437 44094 46100 48406 45874 46012
Maximum simulated 39250 45029 46936 49194 46488 46583
Minimum simulated 37863 43225 45377 47604 44765 45461
Standard deviation 258 341 274 316 343 295
A perhaps unexpected result for the modelled fleet is that using only cannibalisation (scenarios 2 and 5) brings more
benefit to fleet performance in terms of MCR, MGAR, MAR and maintenance cost than the case where
cannibalisation is not allowed but there exists one spare for each type of component (scenario 3). Compared with
scenario 3, using a cannibalisation bird (scenario 2) brings a 4.9% increase in MCR, a 25.5% decrease in the MAR,
a 47.9% decrease in the MGAR and a 4.4% decrease in the maintenance cost. While using unrestricted
cannibalisation (scenario 5), the fleet MCR increases 8.5% with MAR, MGAR and cost decreasing 41.0%, 76.6%
and 0.5%, respectively. The reason why performance is better when using cannibalisation than when using spares
might be that one spare for each type of component is not enough to maintain the fleet MCR due to the high
frequency of failures (approximately 3 failures per day) and long component repair time (on average over 100 hours),
whereas cannibalisation provides a constantly refreshed supply of cannibalisation sources.
The results also suggest that, for the modelled fleet, the unrestricted cannibalisation policy is more effective than
the cannibalisation bird policy in improving fleet performance as measured by MCR and MAR, but leads to more
cannibalisations being performed. When spares are not used, employing the unrestricted cannibalisation policy can
increase the average MCR by 3.1%, and decreases the MAR and MGAR by 20.8% and 55.1% compared to the
cannibalisation bird policy. However, this comes with a 440% increase in the CAR. When spares are also available,
using the unrestricted cannibalisation policy causes the fleet MCR to increase 2.5%, with the MAR and MGAR
respectively decreasing by 15.4% and 53.1% compared to the cannibalisation bird policy. However, the use of
cannibalisation is still very high when applying the unrestricted cannibalisation policy, with the average CAR
increasing about 250%.
Therefore, for the modelled fleet, it can be concluded that using either unrestricted cannibalisation or the
cannibalisation bird policy is beneficial in improving the fleet performance with the MCR increased and mission
cancellations reduced. The fleet could generally perform better as measured by the MCR using unrestricted
cannibalisation, but fewer cannibalisations would be required when employing the cannibalisation bird policy.
4.2 Optimising the Implementation of the Cannibalisation Bird Policy
The number of cannibalisation birds that the fleet simultaneously keeps and the length of time that a platform is
used as a cannibalisation bird may have a significant effect on performance under the cannibalisation bird policy.
Thus, when the cannibalisation bird policy is applied it may be necessary for fleet managers to decide the appropriate
number of birds to be used at any one time and the length of bird life that maximises the benefits gained by using
this policy.
Table 9. Fleet performance under different number of cannibalisation birds without spares
Fleet Performance 1 2 3 4 5
MCR
Average 85.0% 86.0% 87.4% 87.6% 86.5%
Maximum simulated 85.7% 86.5% 87.7% 87.9% 86.7%
Minimum simulated 84.4% 85.5% 87.0% 87.4% 86.3%
Standard deviation 0.24% 0.20% 0.14% 0.10% 0.07%
MAR
Average 12.0% 11.0% 9.7% 9.1% 9.3%
Maximum simulated 12.6% 11.6% 10.3% 9.4% 9.5%
Minimum simulated 11.2% 10.6% 9.5% 8.8% 9.1%
Standard deviation 0.24% 0.21% 0.15% 0.11% 0.10%
MGAR
Average 4.9% 3.9% 2.5% 1.8% 2.0%
Maximum simulated 5.6% 4.4% 2.9% 2.0% 2.2%
Minimum simulated 4.0% 3.4% 2.2% 1.5% 1.8%
Standard deviation 0.25% 0.21% 0.12% 0.09% 0.08%
MAAR
Average 7.1% 7.1% 7.2% 7.3% 7.3%
Maximum simulated 7.2% 7.2% 7.4% 7.5% 7.4%
Minimum simulated 6.9% 7.0% 7.1% 7.2% 7.2%
Standard deviation 0.05% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.06%
CAR
Average 0.74 1.47 2.14 2.67 3.01
Maximum simulated 0.76 1.49 2.17 2.72 3.07
Minimum simulated 0.72 1.46 2.11 2.63 2.95
Standard deviation 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.024
Cost($k)
Average 44094 44578 45342 45626 45627
Maximum simulated 45029 45279 46516 46525 46523
Minimum simulated 43225 43633 44075 44937 44688
Standard deviation 341 308 379 316 372
First, the appropriate number of cannibalisation birds for the modelled fleet is investigated. 5 scenarios are studied
in which the number of birds used differs from 1 to 5. Spares are not used in all scenarios and the bird life is set to
be 30 days. The random discipline is applied to platform restoration queuing, the selection of platforms to be kept
as birds and the selection of birds to cannibalise from when more than one bird contains the required working
components. Note that the scenario with one bird has already been considered and the related fleet performance is
shown in Table 8. The results are repeated in Table 9, for clarity, together with the fleet performance under the other
4 scenarios.
The simulation results show that the fleet CAR increases with the number of cannibalisation birds. When 5
cannibalisation birds are used, approximately 3.01 cannibalisations are used every 100 missions, which is over 4
times as many as when only one bird is used. The fleet performance as measured by the other metrics generally
increases with the number of cannibalisation birds until the number of birds reaches 4, with the fleet MCR increasing
3.1% and the MGAR and MAR respectively decreasing 63.3% and 24.2%. However, when the number of
cannibalisation birds increases to 5, the average fleet MCR decreases 1.3% with the MGAR increasing 11.1%,
which means that it is not necessary to use 5 birds since they do not all directly contribute to fleet MCR and are also
not allowed to perform missions. Therefore, in order to maximise the positive effects of the cannibalisation bird
policy on fleet performance, if spares are not provisioned it might be necessary to keep 4 MC platforms as birds
when a bird is used for 30 days.
To further investigate the appropriate length of bird life, 10 scenarios are studied, within which bird life length
varies from 5 to 50 days. Four cannibalisation birds are assumed to be used at a time. Table 10 shows the related
fleet performance under the 10 scenarios.
Table 10. Simulation results under various bird life
Fleet Performance 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
MCR
Average 86.4% 87.1% 87.3% 87.5% 87.5% 87.6% 87.6% 87.6% 87.5% 87.6%
Maximum simulated 86.7% 87.4% 87.6% 87.8% 87.8% 87.9% 87.8% 87.9% 87.7% 87.8%
Minimum simulated 86.1% 86.8% 87.1% 87.2% 87.3% 87.4% 87.3% 87.4% 87.3% 87.5%
Standard deviation 0.13% 0.12% 0.08% 0.12% 0.11% 0.10% 0.13% 0.11% 0.11% 0.07%
MAR
Average 10.9% 9.8% 9.5% 9.2% 9.2% 9.1% 9.1% 9.0% 9.1% 9.0%
Maximum simulated 11.2% 10.3% 9.7% 9.6% 9.5% 9.4% 9.4% 9.3% 9.4% 9.2%
Minimum simulated 10.6% 9.5% 9.2% 8.9% 8.9% 8.8% 8.8% 8.7% 8.9% 8.9%
Standard deviation 0.15% 0.15% 0.09% 0.14% 0.12% 0.11% 0.14% 0.12% 0.13% 0.09%
MGAR
Average 3.8% 2.6% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7%
Maximum simulated 4.1% 3.0% 2.4% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.1% 1.9% 2.1% 1.9%
Minimum simulated 3.4% 2.3% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 1.6% 1.4% 1.7% 1.6%
Standard deviation 0.15% 0.13% 0.09% 0.11% 0.10% 0.09% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 0.07%
MAAR
Average 7.1% 7.2% 7.30% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3% 7.3%
Maximum simulated 7.3% 7.3% 7.4% 7.5% 7.4% 7.5% 7.5% 7.4% 7.4% 7.4%
Minimum simulated 7.0% 7.1% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2%
Standard deviation 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05%
CAR
Average 10.55 6.37 4.67 3.76 3.11 2.67 2.37 2.10 1.90 1.73
Maximum simulated 10.71 6.50 4.77 3.83 3.15 2.72 2.41 2.12 1.92 1.74
Minimum simulated 10.31 6.24 4.61 3.69 3.07 2.63 2.35 2.08 1.88 1.71
Standard deviation 0.094 0.058 0.036 0.028 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.009
Cost
($k)
Average 46588 46103 45953 45891 45739 45626 45518 45528 45574 45446
Maximum simulated 47338 46735 46802 46877 46469 46525 46608 46080 46248 46054
Minimum simulated 45895 45449 45200 45055 45074 44937 44830 44895 44886 44856
Standard deviation 342 340 356 385 330 316 332 301 327 301
When four cannibalisation birds are used and the bird life is no more than 50 days, the simulation results show a
tendency for the fleet performance to increase as bird life length increases. When the bird life increases from 5 days
to 30 days, the average fleet MCR increases 1.4% with a 52.6% decrease in MGAR and a 74.7% decrease in the
CAR. This may be because the shorter bird life means more cannibalisation recoveries are performed during the
fleet lifetime, which results in more cannibalisation actions and fewer platforms available to be assigned to perform
missions. As the bird life increases from 30 to 50 days, the CAR decreases 35.2% and fleet MCR, MGAR and
MAAR and maintenance cost remain almost stable. This may be because fewer cannibalisation recoveries are
required when a bird is used for a longer time and using four birds at a time can provide sufficient cannibalisation
resources. Recall that in order to avoid hangar queens a cannibalisation bird is generally not allowed to be used for
more than 30 days. Considering that the fleet has similar performance when the bird life is 30 days or more, for the
modelled fleet it may be better not to use a cannibalisation bird for more than 30 days if 4 birds are kept at a time.
5. Summary and Conclusions
A HCPN model of fleet operation and maintenance under multiple cannibalisation policies has been developed. A
number of fleet factors are considered including mission-oriented operation, multiple level maintenance
organisation, multiple platform failure modes, unrestricted cannibalisation, cannibalisation birds, component repair
and spare inventories. The HCPN model consists of a number of modules, which are organised at a number of levels
and connected by port places, socket places and substitution transitions. Due to the flexibility of the HCPN model,
a variety of fleets, differing according to fleet size, operational requirements, maintenance organisation and
maintenance policies, can be directly studied without modification of the model. In addition, due to the modular
structure of the HCPN model, it can be easily extended to model practical fleets if further operation and maintenance
factors must be considered.
The HCPN model delivers a powerful tool for fleet managers to design, manage and optimise the fleet maintenance
system. The use of the HCPN model was demonstrated through its application to example fleets with different
cannibalisation policies. The effects of the unrestricted cannibalisation and cannibalisation bird policies on fleet
performance were evaluated and compared, according to a number of reliability and operation related indicators
including MCR, MAR, MGAR, MAAR, CAR and maintenance cost. Further, two decision variables relating to the
cannibalisation bird policy, the number of cannibalisation birds used at any one time and the length of time that a
platform is kept as a bird, are investigated to optimise the implementation of the cannibalisation bird policy for the
modelled fleet. These case studies show the capability of the HCPN model in helping fleet managers to make
maintenance decisions and optimise the maintenance system.
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Appendix: Abbreviations
FT Fault Tree I-level Intermediate Level
PN Petri Nets D-level Depot Level
CPN Coloured Petri Nets PMQ Platform Maintenance Queue
HCPN Hierarchical Coloured Petri Nets PWMQ Platform Waiting Maintenance Queue
MC Mission Capable FMS Fleet Mission Scheduling
NMC Non Mission Capable FMA Fleet Mission Assignment
MCR Mission Capable Rate FMO Fleet Mission Operation
MAR Mission Abort Rate FCAB Fleet Cannibalisation Bird
MAAR Mission Air Abort Rate PF Platform Failure
MGAR Mission Ground Abort Rate OM O-level Maintenance
CAR Cannibalisation Rate IM I-level Maintenance
O-level Organisation Level CAN Cannibalisation Number
DM D-level Maintenance NS New Spare
PRQ Platform Restoration Queuing SCI Spare Component Inventory
CRD Component Replacement Decision ICMQ I-level Component Maintenance Queue
OMA O-level Maintenance Actions DCMQ D-level Component Maintenance Queue
CAIC Cannibalisation Inventory Control SPR Selected Platform to Repair
SIC Spare Inventory Control CAD Cannibalisation Decision
FMS Fleet Missions SID Spare Installation Decision
MUS Mission Under Schedule CCAQ Component Cannibalisation Queue
PMC Platform Mission Capable SSC Selected Spare Component
PNMC Platform Non Mission Capable CRPQ Component Replacement Queue
PAM Platform Assigned Mission CRQ Component Repair Queue
PPM Platform Performing Mission PCA Platform Cannibalised
POG Platform on Ground RFC Removed Failed Component
CAP Cannibalisation Policy RWC Removed Working Component
CAB Cannibalisation Bird CAI Cannibalisation Inventory
CW Component Working IFCRQ I-level Failed Component Repair Queue
CF Component Failed FCTD Failed Component to Depot
MAA Mission Air Abort IRC I-level Repaired Component
MGA Mission Ground Abort DRC D-level Repaired Component
MS Mission Start PCAD Primary Cannibalisation Decision
ME Mission End PSID Primary Spare Installation Decision
PR Platform Restored PUM Platform Undergoing Maintenance
